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I. INTRODUCTION
Employee ownership has ideological cachet in all advanced
industrialized democracies. For many observers, the principle of self-
governance underlying political democracy extends to the economic
sphere. All institutions essential to the basic structure of society must be
consistent with the norms of moral equality and autonomy. Since
corporations allocate income in a market society, and thereby distribute the
resources by which individuals pursue their various notions of the good
life, corporate structures are a part of the basic structure of society.'
Accordingly, corporate decision-making and its resulting income
allocations should be governed by the same fundamental principles of
moral equality and autonomy that are the object of consensus in the
political sphere.2
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to
Henry Hansmann, Vik Khanna, participants at the Michigan-Illinois Comparative Law
Workshop and members of the Wharton Labor Group, for their comments and suggestions.
1. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6-7 (rev. ed. 1999) ("[T]he primary subject
of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of
advantages from social cooperation. . . . Taken together as one scheme, the major
institutions define men's rights and duties and influence their life prospects, what they can
expect to be and how well they can hope to do."). Rawls himself does not discuss whether
employee ownership is necessary to comply with the difference principle, his second
principle ofjustice.
2. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 83 (1985) (arguing
that the people are "entitled to decide by means of the democratic process how economic
enterprises should be owned and controlled in order to achieve, so far as may be possible,
such values as democracy, fairness, efficiency, [and] the cultivation of desirable human
qualities .... "); William Forbath, Why is this Rights Talk Different from all Other Rights
Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1771, 1785-
90, 1793-804 (1994) (discussing the development of the argument for economic democracy
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For other commentators, employee ownership has a primarily
instrumental value. Employee ownership may help cultivate the virtues of
independence and self-respect and may foster broader economic
understanding. These in turn may enable citizens to exercise their political
rights more wisely. In this view, the foundations of a republic are more
secure when citizens own the means of their livelihood. Another
instrumental view of employee ownership is perfectionist, in that the
virtues attendant to employee ownership are deemed inherently good and
worth promoting.4 Finally, in the utilitarian view, employee ownership
benefits the general economy by promoting worker productivity,5 or at least
the welfare of employees, who are expected to enjoy a greater proportion of
firm profits when they are co-owners.6
Despite the multiple grounds on which individuals, groups, and
political parties might wish to promote a program of employee ownership,
only a fraction of employees in the United States holds any substantial
ownership interest in their place of work. Professor Henry Hansmann has
attributed the limited success of employee ownership to decision-making
problems that are endemic to that corporate form. Indeed, employee
ownership has many advantages and disadvantages that are similar in all
countries, regardless of the national system of corporate and employee
governance of which it is a part.' However, the limits of employee
in American history). But see David L. Gregory, Lessons from Publius for Contemporary
Labor Law, 38 ALA. L. REv. 1, 16-28 (1986) (arguing that constitutional republicanism is
incompatible with excessive workplace democracy).
3. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy, 6 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 37 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception
of the Good Life, 3 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 97 (1985).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1000, at 3 (1980) (House Report on Small Business
Employee Ownership Act of 1980) ("[E]mployee-owned firms are more profitable and more
productive than conventional firms .... "). But see Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock
Ownership and Corporate Performance Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 60, 61 (1996) (discussing "free-rider problems among employees [that] limit the
incentive effects of group-based reward systems .... ").
6. See 129 CONG. REc. 33, 818 (1983) (statement of Sen. Russell Long proposing the
Employee Stock Ownership Act of 1983) ("If we continue to rely solely on traditional
techniques of finance, those techniques will continue to allocate productive credit primarily
to the already wealthy .... We need to be able to show people all over the world how the
increasing prosperity of our private property economy spreads out and reaches Americans in
all walks of life.").
7. See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1759 (1990) ("The pattern
of worker ownership seen in the United States is roughly duplicated in other market
economies: The types of industries in which worker-owned firms are found, and the
structures those firms assume, are remarkably similar everywhere."). Although employee
ownership is common among service professionals, it is limited among low-income
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ownership cannot be deduced a priori. Employee ownership varies
considerably across institutional environments.8 In this Article, I compare
its development in the United States, Germany, and Sweden and show that
the institutional background-in particular, the existing body of corporate
and labor law-against which a program of employee ownership arises
significantly determines its course.
Employee ownership among low-wage workers has only arisen on any
significant scale as the intended result of a legislative program. Such a
program might be coercive, as in Germany and Sweden, or incentive-based,
as in the United States. Either way, it is not possible to treat an existing
form of employee ownership as a winning model in any but the strictly
political sense; it is not the product of competition among models of
employee ownership, let alone competition among the full range of
corporate forms. As such, to explain the model of employee ownership
pursued in each country, one must look less to the merits of the model as a
whole and more to the marginal gains and losses generated for the relevant
political interests.
Since these programs were not designed to overhaul whole structures
of corporate governance, the range of employee ownership models
available in each case was significantly constrained. Existing patterns of
corporate governance influenced which forms of employee ownership were
most desirable to the relevant political actors. Since labor has played very
different roles in the corporate governance of large firms in the United
States, Germany, and Sweden, employee ownership looks very different in
each country.
Two important features of employee ownership vary. First, ownership
of a firm may entail either control over management or the capture of
residual earnings. Second, ownership may vest in employees either as
individuals or as a collective. Neither of these features is binary.
Ownership may encompass residual earnings and control; or, as is more
likely in the context of employee ownership, ownership may encompass
capture of some residual earnings and some control over management. In
practice the capture of residual earnings and control over management are
not easily distinguishable. Control may secure more regular access to firm
profits than a legal right to residual earnings standing alone.9 Similarly,
workers, especially in the manufacturing sector. See id. at 1758. In this Article, I focus on
the extension of employee ownership outside the regular capitalist class.
8. My focus is on the differences between the institutional environments in which
programs promoting employee ownership operate. Other environmental differences will
affect the viability of employee ownership in a given firm, including sectoral variations in
the factors considered infra in Part II and the degree of cultural homogeneity in a workforce.
9. For example, employees may use control to obtain employment security. See
KATRINA V. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
228 (1967) (examining the striking example of the plywood industry where workers enjoy
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without legally mandated lines of control, as provided to regular
shareholders, residual earning rights are in jeopardy.'0 Although it is
sometimes ambiguous whether a particular form of control amounts to
ownership, the property status of residual earnings rights are also
sometimes vague."
The second feature of employee ownership, namely, its individualistic
or collective character, is similarly complex. Employee ownership may
create some property rights in the individual that are realized only after the
employee has achieved a long tenure or even retirement. In the meantime,
these rights may be administered by a group trust. Thus, the two variations
on each factor--earnings/control and individualism/collectivism-are only
axes along which different forms of employee ownership can be placed.
Understanding employee ownership in these terms avoids an arbitrary
threshold of ownership or control above which workers are owners and
below which they are mere "partial" owners.
I will argue that the role of workers in corporate governance prior to a
program of employee ownership helps explain the form that employee
control and residual rights but appear to value primarily the former). Berman found that
shareholders in plywood cooperatives seemed to be purchasing employment security rather
than financial returns, since
[t]he existence of a positive price for the shares of any operating plywood
cooperative, even when it is paying and has been paying shareholders wages
below union scales, would indicate that return on the share as a financial
investment is not an important consideration to a share buyer. What the share
buyer is buying is probably security of employment, not a financial return.
Id.
10. See MARTIN CARNOY & DEREK SHEARER, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE
OF THE 1980S 109 (1980) (arguing that because employees lack control over their share
votes in ESOP funds and because young workers are more willing to offer wage concessions
to protect pension investments, employers may actually gain leverage over employees by
playing on divisions between older and younger workers-the latter will be increasingly
willing to offer wage concessions to protect pension investments); ROBERT F. FOERSTER &
ELSE H. DIETEL, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (3rd prtg. 1929)
(discussing how employers can use the long vestiture periods in employee stock plans to
diminish labor turnover).
11. For example, one scholar finds it likely that "the distinction between 'profit sharing'
and 'employee ownership' is not as large as previously thought .. " Joseph R. Blasi, The
Development and the Future of Employee Ownership in the Publicly Traded Corporation, in
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 195, 203 (Karen M. Young ed.,
1990). Most profit-sharing plans are in fact deferred profit-sharing plans, and deferred
profit sharing trusts hold more outstanding corporate stock than ESOPs. But see Louis 0.
KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 192 (1958) ("There is a
profound difference in principle between laboristic profit-sharing and capitalistic equity-
sharing. The former provides only an income or supplement to income for the worker to
live on when he ceases to earn wages. The latter enables the worker gradually to shift, over
the period of his employment, from absolute dependence on toil as the source of his income
to dependence, in a substantial degree, on his ownership of a capital interest.").
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ownership ultimately takes. Although it is important to understand the
advantages and disadvantages of various complete structures of ownership,
no legislative program starts from scratch. Background institutions
determine the cost of worker control over management, the cost of
collective decision-making, and the expected gains from risk-bearing.
Workers and their representative organizations push for, or allow, only
those employee ownership programs that secure what is absent, but
feasible, in light of their existing range of tools. In those political
conditions under which employee ownership is a viable program, employee
ownership legislation can only augment, not revise, the present institutional
resources of organized labor.
Where workers have arm's-length, weak contractual relationships with
their firms, as in the United States, we can expect employee ownership to
focus on residual earnings and to vest in individuals. Unions lack the
power to reliably secure residual income on their own, and they do not
have the capacity to mediate heterogeneous worker interests (nor the
political influence to convince legislators otherwise).12 If unions cannot be
trusted to adequately represent the interests of all workers, workers have no
agent other than management to exercise control on their behalf. In
contrast, where unions already have deep and unquestioned influence over
the regulation of the employment relationship through sweeping industry-
wide bargains, as in Germany, we can expect employee ownership
primarily to enhance employee control. Unions are already able to secure
through collective bargaining their share of profits in the form of wage
increases and pension benefits. They have the most to gain by effectively
expanding the scope of their bargains. Employee ownership in Germany
therefore takes the form of control rights and is manifest in works councils
and supervisory board participation. Control is usually vested in union
representatives, who are elected on a firm-wide basis but have industry-
wide ties. Worker conflicts of interest are handled no more or less
problematically than the law anticipates elsewhere in the labor code. In
Sweden, the national union confederation and its political ally, the Social
Democratic Party, have long used macroeconomic policy to exact
significant influence over the microeconomics of private firms. The
Swedish program of employee ownership therefore sought control, first
through local union power and codetermination, and later through wage
earner funds. The collective fund approach was adopted because individual
12. These generalizations about unions and collective bargaining in the United States
clearly do not hold true for all firms. However, general patterns are what matter for a
legislative program to promote employee ownership. Had the most powerful unions
dominated the legislative process behind employee ownership, then their experience-rather
than the general experience-might matter. But unions were not important to the legislative
impetus behind ESOPs.
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residual earnings rights would undermine the central policies of the
national labor movement. But collective employee ownership was beyond
the political capacity of even the Swedish left. In the end, Swedish unions
exercise managerial control in much the same way German unions do, but
they achieved this power through legislative fiat rather than internal
institutional adaptation.
We might account for the varieties of employee ownership by looking
to the cultures that generate them. After all, employee ownership serves
multiple purposes at once. It may reduce worker alienation and enhance
job satisfaction; it may increase employment security and worker income
and wealth; and in some cases, it might increase productivity. However,
while any model of worker ownership serves some purposes more directly
than others, it would be difficult to assign any singular purpose to the
culture of employee ownership in any country. Even where the program
ultimately adopted clearly favors some ends over others, the rhetoric of its
advocates-not to mention the rhetoric embraced by the public at large,
whose views must factor in any cultural argument-will embrace several
goals simultaneously. 3 It would be of dubious value, and probably
arbitrary, to claim that economic democracy is more valued in one country
while industrial democracy is more valued in another. It is probably safe to
say that both economic equality and workplace participation are more
valued in continental Europe than in the United States. 14 But even this
assumption does not help explain why economic democracy appears to
13. See DAHL, supra note 2, at 135 (stating that in the United States, where ESOPs
create rights to residual earnings but allow little worker control, "we have a right to govern
ourselves democratically within our economic enterprises"). Even those concerned with
productivity embrace both purposes. If they endorse employee ownership at all, they do so
on the grounds that employee ownership is efficient only when residual and control rights
are combined. See, e.g., JOHN LOGUE & JACQUELYN YATES, THE REAL WORLD OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 5-6 (2001) (referring to a study by the United States government's
General Accounting Office, which found that the companies which combined employee
ownership and employee participation improved their performance). It is not plausible to
explain the limits of workplace participation in the United States by pointing to a culture in
which "having a say" is not important.
14. Arie Shirom suggests that even cooperatives formed between 1880 and 1935 in the
United States were formed as defensive measures to gain employment security and attempt
entrepreneurial success; they had nothing to do with the collectivist ideals associated with
the European labor movement. Arie Shirom, The Industrial Relations Systems of Industrial
Cooperatives in the United States, 1880-1935, 13 LAB. HIST. 533, 550-51 (2001). But the
culture of collectivism may be more a product of, than an impetus for, collectivist
institutions. For example, it might be that workers in Europe perceive their work to be a
more essential aspect of their identity, and therefore have a greater autonomy interest in
workplace control. Worker identities may be so constructed because corporatist
associations in continental Europe have historically mediated individuals' relationships with
society and the state.
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motivate American employee ownership while industrial democracy
appears to motivate German codetermination.
It may be that property rights are more sacred in the United States, and
that Americans are therefore less willing to disaggregate shareholders'
rights to residual earnings from their right to control the firm. But this is
precisely because those with a right to intervene in the affairs of a firm are
likely to divert the income stream to their favor. Why would a culture
recognize the practical limits to disaggregation in one context, but find no
discomfort in the disaggregation of residual rights and effective control in
the context of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), where agency
costs are likely to exceed those borne by shareholders vis-A-vis
management? 5 In fact, there is cultural discomfort with the disaggregation
of residual earnings from control in the context of ESOPs. To explain why
only some discomforts manifest themselves in law, we need to look at the
institutions that make some comforts more costly than others.
My argument progresses as follows. In Part II, I identify three
features of existing corporate and labor arrangements that jointly determine
the likely form and durability of a program of employee ownership. In Part
III, I describe the disparate efforts to promote employee ownership in the
United States, Germany and Sweden. I choose these three countries
because the United States is the usual prototype of the classic liberal model
of political economy, Germany is the classic prototype of the neo-
corporatist political economy, and Sweden is taken to represent the social
democratic model. 6 In discussing the course of employee ownership
initiatives in each country, I show how the features identified in Part II
shape the selection of an employee ownership model and its viability. In
my conclusion, Part IV, I suggest that employee ownership should be
reassessed as a means by which to promote distributive justice and
workplace satisfaction in the United States. There is nothing inherent in
the notion of employee ownership that makes it a bad deal for workers, but
given our present institutional resources, we may best serve at least our
distributive objectives by encouraging share ownership more broadly.
II. BACKGROUND INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INCENTIVE EFFECTS
Several aspects of the role of workers in the firm inform whether
employee ownership legislation grants workers, individually or
collectively, residual earnings rights or control rights.
15. This is not inevitable but rather the consequence of strong legal protections for
shareholders.
16. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 192
(1990).
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A. The Costs of Contracting and Worker Gains from Employee
Ownership
The more costly contracting is for workers, the greater the incentive to
acquire ownership rights. The costs of contracting include both transaction
costs and bad bargains. That is, workers face high contract costs vis-A-vis
their employers when it is costly to obtain an agreement and/or when the
agreement is exploitive. "[W]orker ownership is a form of vertical
integration" and one might expect it "to arise where the problem of
[worker] lock-in [and its resulting opportunism] is particularly severe.""
High contracting costs raise the value of ownership, but may not alter
the value of residual income rights and control rights relative to one
another. That is, although we would expect less worker interest in
ownership in countries where worker contracting costs are low, we would
not expect (on these grounds alone) that either control rights or residual
rights would be favored. The conditions for low contracting costs,
however, are also those that minimize the risk to which workers are
exposed. Strong unions can bargain to minimize the short-term impact of
hard times on their workforce. Workers protected by strong unions also
have longer time horizons. Insofar as residual rights replace periodically-
bargained wages, benefits and other protections, residual rights may
increase the risk to which workers are exposed.'" Enhanced control rights,
by contrast, are likely to diminish risk exposure. Voice within a
corporation will not enable workers to avoid the risks associated with firm-
specific investments, but it would enable workers to influence more
effectively the distribution of losses in hard times.
Where collective bargaining is able to secure workers' share of firm
profits over time, we will expect less worker enthusiasm for employee
ownership, and for residual ownership rights in particular. Workers
protected by strong unions will favor expanded control rights.
B. The Costs of Capital and the Costs of Employee Ownership
Meanwhile, we should expect less employer opposition to employee
ownership where employers are already dealing with strong collective
bargaining partners. Where shareholder control is already "tainted,"
securities markets are limited. 9 The more limited they are, the lower the
17. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 1764.
18. Residual earnings rights would be less risky to the extent they entailed control, but
always more risky than an equal level of control without a financial stake.
19. Mark Roe argues that ownership is often concentrated in social democracies
because
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opportunity cost of worker control. While any increase in worker control
entails a decline in shareholder control, block owners are better positioned
to monitor their investments.20 In a public firm, by contrast, worker control
rights will dilute significantly the allegiance of managers to shareholders,
and this will raise the cost of raising capital for the firm.2 ' Firms with
diverse shares are therefore more likely to oppose employee control rights.
We should therefore expect less opposition to worker control in continental
Europe and more opposition in the United States. The consequence is not
necessarily favorable to unions in the short-term, since it means that, as in
Germany, a center-right government may author employee ownership
legislation. However, employer acceptance of worker property rights
facilitates their realization in the long-term.
the delicate threads that tie managers to shareholders in the public firm fray
easily .... Social democracies press managers to stabilize employment, to
forego some profit-maximizing risks with the firm, and to use up capital in
place rather than to downsize when markets no longer are aligned with the
firm's production capabilities. Since managers must have discretion in the
public firm, how they use that discretion is crucial to stockholders, and social
democratic pressures induce managers to stray farther than otherwise from their
shareholders' profit maximizing goals.
Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53
STAN. L. REV. 539, 539 (2000). In such an environment, private and block owners have
more incentive to monitor. Id. at 548. Roe offers German codeterminism as an example of
government interventions that raise agency costs in this way. Id. at 548. To avoid abuse of
managerial discretion, "[d]ominant blockholders meet managers informally outside of the
boardroom." Id. at 568.
20. Even block investors may be reluctant to lend capital when worker ownership
leaves no room for shared control. Henry M. Levin, ESOPs and the Financing of Worker-
Cooperatives, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 245, 246 (Robert Jackall and Henry
Levin eds., 1984) (suggesting that one of the main reasons why worker cooperatives and
employee-owned firms have problems accessing loan capital is because "[flinancial lenders
prefer to have some measure of control over the affairs of their borrowers," usually through
a director on the firm's board or a personal relationship with the owner of a small business).
Worker cooperatives want to govern themselves and offer no stable representative with
which the lender can deal. Id. The employee control rights envisioned here are primarily
partial rights, so there is substantial room for investor control, especially for large investors
with the incentive and capacity for close monitoring.
21. Besides explaining basic differences between the United States and continental
Europe, this observation is consistent with variations within the United States. HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 109 (1996). Firms in which a majority of stock
is employee-owned are almost exclusively privately held; even there, ESOP votes are rarely
passed along to employees. Id.
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C. The Costs of Collective Decision-making and the Feasibility of
Control
Even if it were in the interests of worker organizations to increase
their control over firms, the expected gains might be offset by the costs of
exercising control. In the United States, the exercise of workers' control
rights would be costly for the same reason that it is difficult to reliably
secure workers' share of profits: unions are weak. In this context, workers
can only exercise influence "legitimately" through voting. While voting
brings outcomes closer to the median (and therefore, average) preference
set than does market contracting, which would shape compensation to the
marginal workers' preferences, voting becomes increasingly unwieldy as
preferences diverge.22  The costs associated with heterogeneous interests
are in part (1) transactional, i.e., representation of interests cannot be
consolidated effectively, resulting in increased information and monitoring
costs; and in part (2) the loss to outlying group members held to
unfavorable bargains struck in their own name. Where these costs are very
high, the nonprofit form may be appropriate. 23 The nonprofit model indeed
resembles a fully developed ESOP, in which workers possess extensive
residual earnings rights but little control.
Where unions are strong, however, they have a recognized ability to
represent the sometimes conflicting interests of workers. Instead of direct
voting, complex election procedures produce union officers with multiple
lines of accountability, capable of mediating, or at least masking, divergent
worker interests. 24 The politics of wage compression, by which industry-
level bargains narrow wage differentials between high and low-wage
workers within a sector, testify to the capacity of strong unions to
successfully use their federated structures to manage heterogeneous
interests. The task of union agents will become more difficult as the range
of interests encompassed by worker principals expands, as it inevitably
would were legislation to grant workers more rights of control. The gains
22. Id. at 12, 31.
23. Id. at 48.
24. Hansmann points out that "while different groups of shareholders in investor-owned
firms sometimes have conflicting interests, corporate law provides means for constraining
and resolving the worst of these conflicts in corporate decision making." Id. at 90. It would
be difficult for the law to place analogous constraints on employee decision making,
however, because there are "no simple objective criteria by which to determine whether a
particular subgroup of employees is being treated unfairly." Id. at 91. Even if that is true,
for purposes of explaining which forms of employee ownership will arise under various
institutional conditions, it is only necessary that institutions are capable of managing diverse
interests, not that they do so in a manner that all would deem fair. The question of whether
neo-corporatism unjustifiably conflates heterogeneous interests, even in the limited context
of collective bargaining, need not be dealt with here.
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(if any) of union representation will decline for some workers to the
advantage of others. But disadvantage and even dissatisfaction on the part
of some workers does not necessarily undermine the stability of the
representative institution. While they might have this effect where
structures of representation are erected anew for the purpose of instituting
an employee ownership program, where such structures and practices are
deeply entrenched in corporate life and law, legislatively mandated worker
control rights do not impose unmanageable burdens. The normative
question of whether union management in countries like Germany and
Sweden can be characterized as democratic or fair is distinct from the
positive question of whether collective bargaining institutions in fact
manage and represent diverse interests with stable authority over time.
III. MODELS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
A. United States
Shares have been widely held for some time in the United States. 5
Employee ownership through stockholding has accelerated more recently,
but already in 1990, more employees participated in employee ownership
plans in publicly traded or closely held corporations than were members of
trade unions in the private sector workforce.26 Employee ownership is
becoming increasingly mainstream. As the political offspring of the
moderate Southern Democrat, Senator Russell Long, and the intellectual
offspring of investment banker Louis Kelso, ESOPs were never radical. 7
Like the social welfare state, employee ownership was meant to legitimize
and stabilize capitalism, not overthrow it.
While firms have always been able to initiate employee ownership
programs, ESOPs introduced a variety of incentives to do so which do not
apply to traditional direct stock ownership plans.2 ' Federal legislation also
exempts ESOPs from other laws that would stand in the way of extensive
employee holdings in the employer firm, such as the default diversification
requirements. 9 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 removed limits
25. The number of general stockholders in the country was estimated to have at least
tripled between 1900 and 1922. FOERSTER & DIETEL, supra note 10, at 2.
26. JOSEPH R. BLASI & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE NEW OWNERS 13 (1991) (describing
how employee-owners are distributed in the United States workforce).
27. LOGUE & YATES, supra note 13, at 8.
28. A variety of state laws also encourage employee ownership. See Robert B.
Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 765, 771-72 (1985) (discussing various state laws that encourage employee ownership
programs).
29. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2)
(2000).
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on how much stock could be allocated annually to a worker as long as a
corporation did not allocate more than one-third of worker equity to large
stockholders or highly compensated employees in any year. ESOPs can
purchase stock from an employer or interested party (major stockholders,
officers) for "adequate consideration" even though Section 4975 of the
Internal Revenue Code prohibits this for most pension plans.30 ESOPS are
also permitted to borrow from parties in interest, for example, the
employer.31
ESOPs have advanced multiple commercial interests from the time of
their initial appearance in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. Although Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states that
ESOPs must be for the exclusive and general benefit of participating
employees, the godfather of ESOPs, Senator Long, described it as "a
socially improved technique of corporate finance that also serves as a new
type of employee benefit."32 Given that the prices at which stock is sold
under ESOP plans are not discounted to reflect the limited voting rights
granted, "[t]he actual record for ESOPs appears to be one in which it has
been used more to the advantage of the firm than its employees."
3 3
First, ESOPs help corporations raise funds. Companies use ESOPs for
patient capital and to control benefit costs.3 4 Most ESOPs are leveraged,
meaning the employer makes or arranges, and usually guarantees, a loan
used to purchase stock. The borrowed money goes to the employer
corporation in exchange for the stock. The ESOP trust repays the loan to
the lender with cash, and as employer contributions are made to pay off the
loan, the stock purchased by the plan is assigned to employee participants.
After a participant retires or dies, she is entitled to the full value of the
account. The leveraged ESOP amounts to a tax-favored loan to the
corporation.
ESOP firms have enjoyed privileged access to federal financing
assistance. The Trade Act of 1974 gave priority to loans for companies in
communities adversely affected by foreign trade that would contribute one
quarter of the loan principal to an ESOP.35 This was later amended by the
Trade Adjustment and Assistance Act Amendments of 1983, which
similarly favored companies financing loans through an ESOP. The Small
30. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e) (2000).
31. I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act § 408(b)(3) (2000).
32. JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 23 (1988).
33. Levin, supra note 20, at 249.
34. See BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 26, at 242.
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2373(f) (2000).
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Business Development Act of 1980 made loan guarantees available to
companies with employee ownership of various kinds, including ESOPs.
36
ESOPs confer a number of significant tax advantages. Most
important, employers can deduct the value of stock contributions to the
ESOP trust (or cash contributions with which the trustees, appointed by the
board of directors, subsequently purchase company stock), though
employees pay tax only after they receive and sell their shares.37 The
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 also excused business owners from capital
gains tax if they sell at least 30% of their companies to an ESOP or worker
cooperative and invest the proceeds in another American company within
twelve months. Dividends on stock held in an ESOP became deductible if
paid directly to workers. ESOPs and worker co-ops can assume the estate
tax liability of a business estate in return for a stock contribution worth at
least as much as the liability assumed. Tax incentives remain substantial
even after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, which partially
repealed the interest exclusion on ESOP loans.
A third use for ESOPs is as a vehicle for management entrenchment.38
They allow employers to place large amounts of stock in friendly hands.39
ESOPs may also be used as a defense against takeovers. This role seems to
have been virtually sanctioned by Delaware law and court decisions.4 °
"[T]he multiple purposes served by ESOPs-takeover defense, incentive
alignment, performance-based compensation vehicle-make it particularly
difficult for the court to overturn management's business judgment in
setting up an ESOP plan.
4 1
Fourth, ESOPs may be established to win concessions from
employees; stock ownership programs are often "Kinder der Not., 42 In the
1920s, only seventeen producer cooperatives and employee-owned firms
were formed, while 271 were formed in the 1930s. In the 1940s only
fifteen were formed.43 One report indicated that 35% of collective
36. Small Business Development Act of 1980 §§ 503-505, 15 U.S.C. §§ 632(c),
636(a)(15) (2000).
37. I.R.C. § 404 (a)(9) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
38. See Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion,
23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 149 (1986) (arguing that an "unintended consequence is strongly
to favor incumbent management in battles for corporate control").
39. Lilli Gordon & John Pound, ESOPs and Corporate Control, in THE EXPANDING
ROLE OF ESOPs IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 57, 57-58 (Karen M. Young ed., 1990).
40. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(holding that defensive measures taken by the board of directors were reasonable).
41. Gordon & Pound, supra note 39, at 61.
42. Certain aspects of German industrial and corporate structure are often explained as
such "children of emergency."
43. Derek C. Jones, American Producer Cooperatives and Employee-Owned Firms: A
Historical Perspective, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 37, 39 (Robert Jackall and
Henry Levin eds., 1984).
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bargaining agreements involving wage concessions also provided for
employee stock ownership. 4
B. Problems with ESOPs
The advantages ESOPs confer on their parent companies would work
to the advantage of employee owners as well if increased profitability were
passed on to employees. However, several features of ESOPs render them
poor means by which to transfer residual earnings rights effectively. As
employee tenure shortens, employees may leave firms before their benefits
vest, losing their equity. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly
addressed this problem, but the problem still remains in some form today.45
Most strikingly, employees in ESOPs are exposed to greater risk than
they would be were they to invest individually in mutual funds.46
Employees in ESOPs are exposed to four types of risk at once: investment
risk (if the stock goes down), longevity risk (workers may outlive their
assets), contribution risk (contribution required over long period of time to
obtain benefit), and inflation risk (worker, not company, affected by
declining value of money).47  The relative increase in risk is worsened
because the implementation of ESOPs may spur the decline of defined
benefit pension plans that provide government-guaranteed pensions. Both
over-funding and under-funding of those pension plans have presented
management with incentives to terminate them.48
The risk resulting from the concentration of holdings in one firm
reduces the expected value of the investment below diversified alternatives.
The higher degree of risk could be offset if workers had reason to believe
their firms were more profitable than the market price of stock would
suggest. But that argument is difficult to generalize for all ESOP firms,
especially since the law assigns to managers and nonemployee owners the
decision to initiate and terminate ESOP plans (and orients incentives
accordingly).49  It is more plausible, but still unsuccessful, to claim that
workers might hope to add value to the stock by owning it, the way a
purchaser of a business might think they would increase the value of a firm
by managing it more effectively. This theory is belied by the degree of
control actually granted worker-owners.
44. Moberly, supra note 28, at 774.
45. Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, (1986); BLASI, supra note 32, at 52.
46. Only "qualified participants," those who have attained age fifty five and ten years of
participation, have a right to an annual diversification period for the ninety day period
following the close of the ESOP plan year. I.R.C. § 401(a)(28)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
47. BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 26, at 3-4.
48. Stephen L. Hester, Employee Ownership: A Union View, in LABOR LAW AND
BusINESS CHANGE 267, 269 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988).
49. BLASI, supra note 32, at 126.
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The absence of worker control is a practical precondition for the
effective manipulation of ESOPs for corporate purposes. The limited role
of unions in corporate governance explains the absence of worker control.
1. Control in ESOPs
The initial theorizing around the advantages of ESOPs focused on the
expected productivity benefits of worker involvement. Corporations
pushed for employee involvement in the 1920s and the federal government
sponsored labor-management committees during the World War II
production effort. These were dismantled, however, between 1946 and
1947 due to postwar hostilities between unions and management. By 1964,
only forty four of the 5,000 committees established during the War still
existed. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, interest in worker
participation grew in response to the success of foreign corporate models.50
However, the form of employee ownership that was ultimately
adopted makes little room for employee involvement. Employees are
usually represented by the firm's managers, even when employees are the
largest stockholders.' As fiduciaries, manager-trustees are required to act
based on employees' interests qua stockholders, not workers.12 Workers
exercise no more control than they do over union pension funds, which
include enormous amounts of corporate stock but delegate all investment
strategy and voting of stock to financial intermediaries that act as trustees. 3
In publicly held firms, workers can direct trustees as to how to vote
their shares on all matters. ESOPs in privately held firms must pass on
voting rights on major issues (corporate merger or consolidation,
recapitalization, reclassification, liquidation, dissolution, or sale of
substantially all assets of a trade or business), usually those for which state
law or corporate charter requires a majority of outstanding common shares.
Nevertheless, trustees vote unallocated shares as they choose, and have
exclusive authority to manage and control the assets of the plan. 4 Some
plans require that ESOP stock for which no proxies are returned, or that has
not yet been allocated, be voted according to how the majority of voted
employee stock has gone. But the Labor Department is skeptical about the
50. LOGUE & YATES, supra note 13, at 10.
51. BL.ASI & KRUSE, supra note 26, at 245.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
53. See Levin, supra note 20, at 252 ("Indeed, in some cases, the pension funds of
workers are invested in some of the most antilabor firms in the nation.").
54. BLASI, supra note 32, at 55. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 29
U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000).
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validity of such an approach since trustees are legally responsible for
decisions that are not passed on to individual employees.55
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan proposed extending many
traditional ownership rights to workers under ESOPs. Policymakers,
however, were faced with a dilemma: full ownership meant the right to sell
whenever convenient, and this would be "incompatible with ongoing
amounts of substantial worker ownership in American companies that
might serve as a basis for greater labor-management cooperation and a new
way of organizing corporations."5 6 Congress had to choose between
assigning residual income rights to the workforce of a corporation or
assigning control rights to individual employee stock holders.
Opponents of the Administration's proposal argued that "ESOPs were
never intended to provide employees immediately with traditional incidents
of actual stock ownership . . . but to create a capital-accumulation device
designed to ... facilitate corporate financing on favorable terms" and that
"full pass-through of voting rights is not a necessary element of the primary
goals of expanding capital ownership, individual capital accumulation, and
capital-income generation . . . ."" They maintained that "ESOPs
historically have been designed to ensure that employees share in the
appreciation in value of employer securities, not to facilitate direct transfers
of the stock and all indicia of ownership."5 8
The resulting model so heavily favored residual rights that lack of
worker input and information on rudimentary issues led workers to strike in
1980 against a firm in which they owned two-thirds of the vested shares.5 9
In fact, "many public shareholders, institutional investors, and employees
are usually in the dark about just how much employee ownership a
company really has." 60 Employee ownership in the United States therefore
suffers from "many of the same problems of passivity and paternalism that
plagued the countries of state socialism, in addition to the problems of
antiegalitarianism that mark capitalist economies.'
Of course, the ESOP form does not preclude worker participation in
plant-level committees and other low-level participatory mechanisms. But
55. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., Labor Department Advisory Opinion, 11 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 633 (Apr. 30, 1984).
56. BLASI, supra note 32, at 154-55.
57. Id. at 155 (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS: TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 20-27 (Comm. Print
1985)).
58. Id.
59. Levin, supra note 20, at 251.
60. BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 26, at 249.
61. Gregory S. Alexander, Pensioners in America: The Economic Triumph and
Political Limitations of Passive Ownership, in A FOURTH WAY? 33 (Gregory S. Alexander
& Grazyna Skapska eds., 1994).
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to the extent those forms of participation enhance productivity, and are
permissible under labor law, employers would be expected to adopt them
with or without employee share ownership. In any event, ESOPs do not
create a means by which worker-owners may demand the establishment of
such participatory mechanisms.
2. ESOPs and Unions
Unions were not influential in the original designs of ESOPs, for
several reasons. Because unions were suspicious of ESOPs as a means by
which to end adversarial unionism, organized labor did not testify in the
major 1975, 1978, or 1979 Congressional hearings.62 In addition, ESOPs
were alternatives to the defined benefit plans unions had promoted for
years. 63 Finally, stocks and securities were outside the scope of traditional
union expertise. Unions faced a choice between exclusion in a whole area
of employee compensation, a disadvantaged position at the bargaining
table, and hefty expert fees. 64 Unions were right to be wary. The profit-
sharing component of ESOPs usually functions as an alternative to union-
bargained wages and benefits. Furthermore, due to existing legal
constraints on American unions, residual earnings rights cannot be
leveraged to extend worker control.
Most ESOPs begin in nonunionized companies. Where unions are
present, they are excluded from the program. Members of collective
bargaining units are usually excluded because managers do not want union
members in the plans and unions prefer to rely on contracts to control all
forms of compensation benefiting their members.65 Union members are
more likely to participate in ESOPs that are set up in the context of worker
buyouts, wage concessions, or industry restructuring.66 Union-negotiated
ESOPs tend to have more expanded voting rights; however, National Labor
Relations Act decisions make only those features of ESOPs that relate to
compensation or accumulation of credits mandatory subjects of bargaining,
62. BLASI, supra note 32, at 24. The adversarial tradition in the American labor
movement is deep-rooted. Senator Wagner himself said that "[tihe greatest obstacles to
collective bargaining are employer dominated unions, which have multiplied with amazing
rapidity .... The bill which I am introducing today forbids an employer to foster or
participate or influence any organization which deals with the problems that should be
covered by a genuine labor union." David J. Woolf, The Legality of Employee Participation
in Unionized Firms: The Saturn Experience and Beyond, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
557, 567 (1994). Any confusion of roles that might result from participatory rights for
individual workers or the union would undermine the purity of a "genuine labor union."
63. Blasi, supra note 11, at 206.
64. Hester, supra note 48, at 269.
65. BLASI, supra note 32, at 44-45.
66. Id. at 175.
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and these do not encompass voting rights.67 Unions have no means by
which to act as worker agents on issues where employees have rights as
owners (stockholders) but not as employees.68
Nationally, control was not adopted as either a complement or
substitute to residual earnings rights because in most firms, unions are in no
position to administer control rights. Most significantly, unions are not
trusted as agents of worker interests, especially as those interests diverge.
Unions might have gained trust through a reliable internal structure, but
more fundamentally, unions suffer from difficulty in specifying the
appropriate content of a duty of fair representation.69 In 1976, Jacob Javits
and Hubert Humphrey introduced a bill in the Senate to integrate employee
ownership with collective bargaining. They proposed joint trusteeship of
ESOP funds by employer and union under Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. The bill went nowhere.7 °
3. History of Adversarial, Arm's-length Relationship between
Unions and Firms
Employers are only required to bargain with unions over a narrow
category of worker concerns.7' Some topics are prohibited and agreements
that interfere with protected employer prerogatives will not be enforced.72
Weak successorship doctrine, under which the bargaining obligation but
not the bargain itself survives, provides corporations no impetus to
negotiate corporate transformations.73
The NLRA has been interpreted to narrow the role of unions in
ESOPs. In an early case where employee stockholders held a substantial
67. Id.
68. Similar obstacles were overcome in 1979 when troubled Chrysler Corporation
asked the President of the United Auto Workers, Douglas Frazier, to serve on its Board of
Directors. See Moberly, supra note 28, at 766 (discussing a situation in which a union
member was asked to serve on the board of directors). But this did not become a significant
trend.
69. Mayer Freed et al., Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 463 (1983).
70. BLASI, supra note 32, at 25.
71. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Although
Fibreboard held that subcontracting must be bargained, Justice Stewart, in his concurrence,
denied any bargaining obligations on decisions at the "core of entrepreneurial conduct." Id.
at 223. More recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions have narrowed the
scope of bargaining duties even further through interpretation of the employer's purposes
and whether they directly concerned labor. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the
Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REv.
73, 94-95 (1988). The approach "insulates most employer decisions involving capital
investment or corporate transformation." Id. at 95.
72. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982)
73. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 71, at 104.
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minority of the employer's stock, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) excluded nine from about eighty other workers in a bargaining
unit.74 The Board held the employee-owners had too much power and a
conflict of interest with others.75 Courts narrowed managerial exclusion to
exclude only those employee owners who actually exercise power where
there is an actual divergence of interest.7 6 The rule usually prohibits the
unionization of supervisory employees, as in NLRB v. Yeshiva University,
which held that the collective decision-making powers of faculty made
them ineligible for unionization.77  That rule was held to require
decertification even where faculty achieved decision-making power
through unionization and collective bargaining.78 Managerial exclusion
was held to prohibit even the unionization of firemen because of their
control over the (non-profit) employer.79 The effect of this interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is "to prevent unions from
exercising power through stock ownership." Yet "bloc voting . . . is
precisely the mechanism that offers employees real power in
management."'
Not only are owner-workers excluded from unions, unions are
excluded from participation in management:
Where the union has direct and immediate allegiances which can
fairly be said to conflict with its function of protecting and
advancing the interests of the employees it represents, it cannot
be a proper representative. On its part, the employer is under a
duty to refrain from any action which would interfere with the
employees' right to have such a representative and which would
"place him even in slight degree on both sides of the bargaining
table."81
The NLRB has since loosened its approach, allowing union
participation as long as it has limited managerial powers.82 If a union
controls less than the majority of a company board, the NLRB will assess
whether any actual conflict exists on a case-by-case basis.83
74. The union wanted them excluded; employers wanted them included.
75. In re Union Furniture Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1307, 1310 (1946). See also Brookings
Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794 (1952), in which the workforce was more even split
between owner-workers and non-owner workers.
76. S-B Printers, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1274, 1274 (1977).
77. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
78. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 265 N.L.R.B. 295, 297 (1982).
79. Florence Volunteer Fire Depart., 265 N.L.R.B. 955, 956-57 (1982).
80. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 71, at 125.
81. Id. at 128-29 (citing Med. Found. of Bellaire, 193 N.L.R.B. 62 (1971)).
82. Anchorage Cmty. Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 575, 575 (1976); Child Day Care Ctr., 252
N.L.R.B. 1177 (1980).
83. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 71, at 129-130.
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These prohibitions on the mixing of employee ownership and control
were in place before ESOPs were created. They not only captured the
attitude of policymakers but also constrained what form employee
ownership would take. Residual earnings rights would be divorced from
managerial powers. Instead of granting workers control rights, firms may
voluntarily undertake low-key consultancy programs like quality control
circles and quality of worklife groups, the former focusing on production
processes to improve product reliability and production efficiency and the
latter focusing on employee satisfaction. Because American labor law
assumes that unions cannot mediate heterogeneous worker interests and
therefore limits the scope of union power, and since unions are in any case
absent from most firms, there is no viable way for workers to exercise
meaningful control in large corporations, even when they "own" those
corporations.
C. Germany
Germany is not without an employee-shareholder program. German
tax concessions to encourage employee share ownership are the remnants
of the debate over wage earners' investment funds. Legislation from 1961,
1965, and 1970 provides tax benefits to firms and employee share
ownership schemes covered by collective agreements between unions and
management. Employees and/or employers make cash contributions that
are invested in the firm on behalf of individual workers. Tax concessions
also encourage firms to sell their own shares to their workers below market
price. The stock must be held in trust for some years before it can be
resold. In 1984, the law was expanded to permit schemes without
reference to union agreements and to make the tax concessions more
generous. In 1987, one million workers participated in such programs."
But the majority of investments under these programs are loan stock (like
bonds), nonvoting shares, or other securities short of ordinary or common
share status. Approximately 0.2% of all workers own shares in their
companies and only 2% of eligible companies have employee ownership
programs. Almost a third allow workers to participate by way of debt
capital, i.e. a loan to the company paid back with a share of company
profits." The more striking allocation of property rights to employees lies
in codetermination and works councils.
Codetermination and works council legislation were perceived as
alternatives to employee residual earnings rights from the start. Trade
84. DONALD A. R. GEORGE, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 121 (1993).
85. Gianna Durso & Raul Rothblatt, Stock Ownership Plans Abroad, in
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 169, 182 (Corey Rosen & Karen M. Young eds.,
1991).
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union economist Bruno Gleitze proposed wage-earner investment funds in
the 1950s, to be financed from a profits tax and administered by the unions.
The Gleitze proposal was developed by the German Social Democratic
Party and the trade unions. The legislation proposed in 1974 would have
instituted a system of funds, "none of which would be confined to a
particular industry or region, and amongst which individuals would be free
to choose. 86  Unions like IG Metall objected and no legislation was
considered. Worker control, or at least, participation, was seen as the real
objective and would be achieved by other means.
The pursuit of control was not a rejection of worker residual earnings
rights. In the sense that the promised higher wages (compensation for firm-
specific investments) are not "fixed" but are contingent on firm
performance, employees share in business risk and are therefore, like
shareholders, "residual claimants. 88  Those residual claims might be
secured through property rights, as in the United States context, or they
might be secured more effectively through collective bargaining. As in the
United States, German industrial relations are juridified (Verrechtlichung).
But German law intervenes to require cooperation rather than to preserve
the purity of adversarial relations. Existing structures of collective
decision-making have rendered control the best route to earnings.
1. Unions and Codetermination Legislation
The Montanbitbestimmung law for the coal and steel industries was
passed in 1951,89 though it was already effectively in place since 1947, due
to strong unions and the weak status of coal and steel barons in light of the
latters' cooperation with the Nazis. Unions mobilized for legislation and it
was difficult to displace an existing institution. The outcomes were
particularly pro-labor: parity on supervisory boards, the allocation of 90%
of labor seats to union members, union-nominated labor directors and tie-
breaking votes cast by neutral members (appointed by labor and capital).90
The center-right party CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) first
presented a draft Mitbestimmung law that gave workers only one third of
the supervisory board seats, but Chancellor Konrad Adenaur backed down
under the threat of massive strikes in the primary sectors:
86. GEORGE, supra note 84, at 144.
87. Id.
88. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 257 (1995).
89. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [Participation Act] 1952, BGBI. 1 (F.R.G.).
90. PETER GOUREVITCH ET AL., UNIONS AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: BRITAIN, WEST
GERMANY AND SWEDEN 97 (1984).
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If we accept union statements at the time, there seems little doubt
that the unions felt Mitbestimmung to be the most important axis
of this postwar program for a "fundamental new order." Unions
foresaw the installation of Mitbestimmung at all levels of society,
from shopfloor, firm and industrial levels, through chambers of
commerce and industry, up to the public institutions which would
give macroeconomic direction to the economy such as federal
and state economic councils.9'
Codetermination was thus consistent with corporatist thinking
generally; it was only possible because unions were recognized, in a
corporatist fashion, as the appropriate representatives of workers.
Still, the liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) wanted to expand
labor representation to all employees (including quasi-managerial
employees) at the expense of unions. 92 Labor politics had shifted to the
right. Unlike the 1951 Montan law, the 1976 codetermination law provided
that the labor director be jointly appointed and gave the employer-
nominated chair the tie-breaking vote. 93 Outside union representatives
were limited to a minority role instead of a majority role as in the 1951 law.
Union representatives also had to be elected by all workers in a firm.
Nevertheless, the 1976 codetermination law did establish parity for all
firms with over 2,000 workers. The law was upheld under Article 14 of the
German Constitution of 1949, which guarantees the right to private
property but also stipulates that "the contents and scope of property rights
shall be determined by the law."94 The Federal Constitutional Court
implied that the law was constitutional because it actually fell short of full
parity.95
Many companies changed their bylaws and reduced the powers of
their supervisory boards in anticipation of the 1976 law. 96 Many also made
mandatory what the law called for only in stalemate-that the shareholder
side of the board appoint the chairman.97 However, courts limited
91. Id. at 96.
92. Id. at 162.
93. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [Participation Act], 1976, BGBI. 1 at 1153 (F.R.G).
94. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.).
95. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 1, 1979,
50 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 290 (331) (F.R.G.)
("Codetermination decision") (stating that private property rights have to give way to public
interest, unless the legislature's conceptualization of the public interest is unconstitutional or
clearly unserved by policies).
96. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 184 (Margaret M. Blair &
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
97. Id. at 186.
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shareholder efforts to undermine parity9" as well as efforts to undermine the
powers of the board.9 9 But the courts did not require parity in board
committees, where much of the work of supervisory boards is now
conducted. In 79% of 281 joint stock companies, shareholders occupied
either the majority of the seats or determined the outcome of votes by
controlling the chairmanship with two votes in case of stalemate.'00
Labor representatives to supervisory boards are chosen by workers, or
workers' electors, in a very complex and heavily regulated election
process. Some seats are guaranteed to persons nominated by trade unions,
rather than by workers at the company.'0 ' The 1976 law also gives at least
one seat on the supervisory board to each class of employee (blue-collar,
white-collar and upper-middle managers) and leaves other labor seats on
the board proportional to payroll. The supervisory board elects one person
to be chairman by a two-thirds vote. If no one gets two-thirds, separate
votes are held by labor and shareholder representatives, with the labor side
electing the vice chairman and the shareholder side electing the chairman.
The rule ensures that no labor candidate for the chair can win without
shareholder consent. The chair and the chairman's extra vote therefore
goes to shareholders.
The Biedenkopf Commission found that German worker-directors
emphasized the social aspects of board decisions but had little effect on
investment decisions, dividends, and takeovers.'0 2  Nevertheless, the
informational role of codetermination is significant in allowing unions to
expand the scope of their influence. This informational advantage of
codetermination is undercut by the informal processes firms use, perhaps to
avoid the law's intended consequences. Decisions may be negotiated in
advance of (infrequent) board meetings and there are indications that the
information flow to the supervisory board is limited in anticipation of
98. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 15, 1982, in 14 Der
Betrieb 742, 747 (1982) (F.R.G.).
99. Id.; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 14, 1983, in 2 Der
Betrieb 104 (1984) (F.R.G.).
100. Pistor, supra note 96, at 187.
101. Two seats are guaranteed for union-nominated on boards with either twelve or
sixteen members, or three seats on twenty member boards.
102. Report of the Mitbestimmungskommission (Federal Commission on
Codetermination), "Mitbestimmung im Untemehmen," January 1970, BTDrucks 4/334; See
also CARNOY AND SHEARER, supra note 10, at 254. But see, JAMES C. FURLONG, LABOR IN
THE BOARDROOM: THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION 7 (1977) (showing that Eugen Loderer, head
of IG Metall, approved a Volkswagen assembly plant in the United States on the condition
that the board approve any increase in the percentage of U.S. components in American-
assembled cars).
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labor's access.'0 3 But the informality of the process takes place on both the
labor and the shareholder sides, as well as across sides. One of the effects
is to limit accountability, which enhances the ability of worker
representatives to negotiate compromises. 104
Unions are able to dominate codetermination. Although workers may
not want to delegate their codetermination rights to unions completely, in
the sense that they will vote for non-union candidates in the supervisory
board primaries, in the actual election they vote overwhelmingly for union
candidates. The main effect of non-union candidacies in the primaries is
therefore to steer the union in the "right direction" rather than to jeopardize
union control. The multi-step process by which board members are elected
works to the unions' advantage, because "the selection, nomination, and
election of electors ... is more easily controlled by the union apparatus
than in direct elections .... "'0'
2. Unions and Works Councils
A similar dynamic of union co-optation played out in the context of
works councils, the second site of worker control. While works councils
could have turned out to be administrative and informational instruments
for management, they have instead become semi-coordinated worker
agents.
The 1848 Frankfurt Constitutional Assembly debated a measure that
would have established factory committees with powers to participate in
owners' decision-making processes. Even without legislation, such
committees were set up voluntarily in some companies in the following
years. In 1905, the Prussian Mining Law ordered the creation of workers
committees in mining companies with over 100 employees. An attempt to
103. E.g., Pistor, supra note 96, at 191 (showing that not all members of supervisory
boards receive the auditor's report, even though they are required to report to the
supervisory board. Finns are afraid that union officers will leak information to unions).
104. The potential conflict of interest generated by unions dual role was evident in a
discussion of codetermination at Volkswagen:
Although both unions and employees will be strongly opposed to any layoffs
during difficult times, it is not inconceivable that the employees might be
willing to accept wage cuts in order to avoid mass work force reductions while
the union would defend the existing wage level of a pace setter even at the
expense of layoffs. As long as the union dominates the employee information
media and as long as management, for its own reasons, is not interested in
challenging this point, this real but hidden conflict between union and
employees will not manifest itself openly.
ALFRED L. THIMM, THE FALSE PROMISE OF CODETERMINATION 136 (1980). The informal
decision-making enables "key board figures to let their positions be known without having
to defend them in public." Id. at 142. The decision-process is thus driven by defaults.
105. Id. at 149.
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widen the rule failed to muster Reichstag approval. However, works
councils with consultative powers were mandated in all war-related plants
with over fifty employees in 1916 and were prominent in the Weimar
Constitution of 1919.106 A 1922 law required companies with supervisory
boards to give one spot to a works council member. The Nazi "Law for the
Arrangement of National Work" dissolved all these bodies. That fact only
gave them special status after World War II. 107
Unlike the 1920 Works Council Law, the 1952 Works Council Law'08
emphasized the independence of works councils from unions, even as it
placed various legal constraints on their activities and purposes. It granted
councils narrower powers in personnel decisions and fewer plant changes
required consultation. The 1952 law was a disappointment for organized
labor because it restricted union activity in the plant and made works
councils the sole legal representatives at the shop level. Unions opposed
the law, favoring instead the centralization of authority, especially with
respect to collective bargaining. 109 But unions responded to passage of the
law by establishing parallel union shop steward committees in all plants.
These committees draw up candidate lists for works council elections. 11
As a result, usually less than 15% of works councilors are nonunion."'
While a challenge to the centralization policy in the late 1960s
decentralized some bargaining to regional bargaining districts, power was
not ceded to the shop floor. Instead, the 1972 revised Works Constitution
Act' 2 "strengthened the rights of works councils vis-d-vis management,
even as it explicitly reinforced their subordination to the central union."'' 3
Since unions had successfully co-opted works councils, their strategy at
that point was to reinforce rather than undermine the institution.
The 1972 Betriebverfassunggesetz enhanced the rights of works
councils to obtain information from management and gave works councils
extensive powers over personnel policy. It granted full codetermination
rights on issues such as working time arrangements in the plant, short-time
work, overtime, work breaks, the establishment of vacation times, plant
wage systems, and the setting of piece rates (para. 87). Managers must
inform and consult the works councils on planned changes in jobs or
production systems, on the introduction of new technologies, and on other
alterations in the work environment (para. 90). They must secure, in
106. FURLONG, supra note 102, at 15.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Labor Management Relations Act], 1952 (F.R.G.).
109. KATHLEEN THELEN, UNION OF PARTS: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTWAR GERMANY 64
(1991).
110. Id. at 78.
111. Id. at80.
112. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Labor Management Relations Act], 1972 (F.R.G.).
113. THELEN, supra note 109, at 65.
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advance, the consent of the works council on a range of personnel decisions
affecting individual workers, including job assignments, classifications and
reclassifications, and transfers (para. 99). Employers enacting major
changes have to bargain with works councils over measures to protect
workers interests, or over compensation (para. 111-2).
Works councils are elected every three years under the 1972 Act.
Although all workers are entitled to vote and stand for election, about 80%
of works councilors are elected from candidates put up by their respective
DGB unions, so "the works council has in effect become the organizational
center of industrial unions at the workplace." Councils have legal rights to
consultation and co-decision making on a range of specified issues and "in
large firms their factual strength often exceeds their legal powers." They
are also legally charged with supervising the implementation of industrial
agreements, but are barred from negotiating on subjects settled by those
agreements, for example, wages. Works councils may not call for a strike;
rather, they must resort to mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.14
Works councilors face a similar conflict of interest to that of union
officers on supervisory boards. Their formal duties are legally defined and
confined to a particular range of interests, but as union officers, they are
also aware of the larger industry goals of their parent unions. For example,
works councils bargain unofficially over supplemental wages and benefits
(fibertarifliche Leistungen) that can form a significant part of workers'
wages, but which undermine the wage compression policies of the central
union through wage drift (especially in good times)." 5  By dominating
works councils, unions are able to internally manage the potential conflicts
between those workers who would benefit from local wage supplements,
and those workers who would see their relative wages decline. Although
common union ties will enable worker representatives at various levels in
the firm to cooperate more smoothly, it may also increase the range of
interests represented, since workers elsewhere in industry, represented by a
common union, also have a stake in the cumulative effect of shop-level
decisions. The range of interests represented is not so important to the
manageability of worker control where homogeneity can be institutionally
engineered.
It may be that the consequence of this model is that workers do not
expect to relate to their councilors as representatives, but rather perceive
them as trustees on the one hand, and practical resources on the other. In a
Siemens survey, 43% of employees said they expected "counsel and
information" from central works councils, 36% expected help in solving
general problems, and 10% expected assistance in dealing with top
114. Wolfgang Streeck, Industrial Relations in West Germany: Agenda for Change, in
FORSCHUNGSSCHwERPuNKT ARBEITSMARKT UND BESCHAFTIGUNG (IIMV) 4-5 (1987).
115. THELEN,supra note 109, at 82-83.
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management.116 Workers were probably aware that works councilors also
had a managerial role, but they did not see it as representative any more
than they might see a bureaucrat as representative. The bureaucrat, like the
works councilors, is supposed to act in workers' interests and provide
certain services to workers, but they are agents, not representatives. Of
course, workers might assign this role to works councils even if councilors
had no meaningful ties with unions. Indeed, 75% of surveyed work
councilors expected primarily training and information from IG Metall and
only 15% expected active policy guidance.' 17  However, that works
councilors stand on a "union ticket" and are union-trained suggests that
their union ties have an impact on the performance of their works councilor
duties.
Union control of codetermination and works councils allows workers
to exercise control over the management of their firms. Union control is
only possible because unions are already delegated significant powers in
the representation of worker interests in the context of collective
bargaining. Because their control is well entrenched, and thus far has
adequately secured workers' share of firm profits, collective control rights,
rather than individual rights to residual income, characterize German
employee ownership.
D. Sweden
Sweden may be one of the most egalitarian societies in the world, but
it is all a matter of perspective. To some Swedes,
the unequal distribution of wealth and economic power in
Scandinavia has not been broken by either wage or tax policies.
No matter how egalitarian economy-wide collective bargaining
agreements, they can equalize income only among wage earners.
No matter how socially democratic the government, it cannot
escalate tax progressivity without threatening the rate of profit
and savings, and thereby undermining the "high rate of
investment on which full employment depends"." 8
The perception of inequality outside the bounds of collective
bargaining agreements is not distorted. A 1968 government commission
found that 5-9% of taxpayers in Sweden owned stocks or shares. " 9 It also
confirmed an unequal distribution of wealth, which remained stable
between 1945 and 1965, despite progressive labor policies. In 1975, 0.3%
116. THIMM, supra note 104, at 163.
117. Id. at 167.
118. Mogens Lykketoft, Toward Economic Democracy: Wage Earner Funds, 2
SCANDINAVIAN REV 40, 41 (1977).
119. DARYL D'ART, ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY AND FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION 153 (1992).
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of Swedish households held 50% of all Swedish shares. 12' A high
proportion of large corporations in Sweden are privately owned, compared
not only to the United States, but also to other western European countries.
At one point, employee property rights in their employers' firms
combined control and residual earnings rights. The labor movement first
used codetermination rights and works councils to strengthen access to
residual earnings over time through collective bargains and worker control.
Organized labor later reasserted its political power to secure direct residual
earnings rights. But only the collective fund was of interest to unions, and
its enemies were more passionate than its friends. The funds were
abolished in 1992 and have not been reinstated.
1. Codetermination and Local Union Control
In 1946, works council legislation enabled unions to negotiate the
establishment of advisory works councils, but union leadership had little
interest. In 1970-71, however, the national trade union confederation, the
Lamdsorganisationen (LO), shifted its basic policy. It rejected article 32 of
the Employers' Confederation Constitution (Svenska
Arbetsgivarefdreningen, SAF) to which it had agreed in the 1938 Basic
Agreement of Saltsjobaden. That provision held that the allocation of
work, hiring, promoting, firing, supervision, work environment, and similar
areas were management prerogatives. As the SAF would not voluntarily
give up its managerial prerogatives, the LO turned to the Social Democratic
Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet, SAP) and obtained mandatory
participation rights through government legislation.
A 1973 law (amended in 1976 and 1988) provides that in firms with at
least twenty five employees, the local trade union can appoint two
members to the board; elections are not required. In companies with 1,000
workers, the union may appoint three representatives. Unions decide
whether to establish board representation, but are not allowed to participate
in meetings where there is a bargaining-related conflict of interest, and they
cannot hold a majority on the board.' In 1977, the Act on
Codetermination at Work made all aspects of management decision-
making negotiable and set minimum union codecision-making rights in the
absence of a governing collective agreement. The legislation also
strengthened employee (union) influence on design of the workplace and
gave unions priority in interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
(until the interpretation is decided by the courts or arbitration). Employers
120. Jonas Pontusson & Sarosh Kuruvilla, Swedish Wage-Earner Funds: An Experiment
in Economic Democracy, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 779, 782 (1992).
121. Lagen om arbetstagarrepresentation i styrelsen [Act on Management
Representation] (1988) (Swed).
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must initiate discussion on any contemplated change in the terms and
conditions of employment, and unions have access to virtually all company
documents.12 2 Unions in Sweden thus dominate the exercise of workers'
control rights. Unlike in Germany, where unions have been able to
dominate codetermination and works councils strategically, the political
alliance between the LO and the SAP ensured union control. In fact, the
substantial legal rights are specified as minimums on which collective
bargaining agreements were expected to build, as they have.
2. Collective Wage Earner Funds (Lbntagarfonderna)
The Fourth National Pension Fund of 1974 set a controversial, but
later generally accepted, precedent of investing pension funds in corporate
shares. Although capital formation through pension funds is common in
Western Europe, legal rules limit risk and corporate influence. In Sweden,
less than 1% of pension savings were in corporate shares before 1983 wage
earner funds were introduced.'
23
Proposals for employee participation in profit sharing on an individual
basis were advocated for many years by members or the Executive
Committee of the Swedish Liberal Party. But most Swedes rejected the
"bourgeois idea of creating more harmonious industrial relations and, thus,
increasing productivity ... .,,124 They feared that "individual profit-sharing
would surely ruin the system of collective bargaining and also threaten the
wages policy of the trade unions. Such a system, it was argued, would
unduly favor employees in the profitable companies and, thus, impede
trade union efforts at wage-leveling between high and low profit
industries."' 25 The political conditions for wage-leveling were central to
the wage strategy of the LO. High wages were exacted uniformly from
firms regardless of productivity on the principle that workers' earnings
should not vary depending on the profitability of their employers, and on
the hope that workers from less efficient firms would be transferred
(through the market) to more efficient, more profitable firms. The latter
firms would grow and expand their workforces since they would have
relatively more profits to reinvest as a result of wage uniformity. 26
Already, wage solidarity, on a more dramatic scale than was the case in
122. Medbestammandelagen [MBL] [Act on Employee Participation in Decision-
Making] (1976) (Swed).
123. Pontusson & Kuruvilla, supra note 120, at 782-83.
124. Erik Asard, Employee Participation in Sweden 1971-1979: The Issue of Economic
Democracy, 1 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 371, 373 (1980).
125. Id.
126. This was known as the Rhen or Rehn-Meidner model.
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Germany, was a tricky political business. Individual residual earnings
rights would undermine that policy.
The purpose of the wage earner funds was not directly ideological, in
that it did not attempt to secure economic democracy. The purpose was to
secure full employment by increasing investment capital by some
nonpublic but also nonprivate means.2 7  Although the Rhen model
anticipated an expansion of employment in profitable firms, in fact the
government had to dramatically expand public employment to maintain full
employment. (This occurred, in part, because these developments
coincided with the rapid entrance of women into the labor market and
unfavorable post-1975 global markets.) Eventually, public deficits and
rapid inflation called for a return to a private investment/private
employment strategy. Private employment prospects hinged on private
investment decisions. Wage earner funds were a means of generating and
directing capital for private investment. Control was sought for the
purpose of promoting employment, and individual residual earning rights,
especially if they could be cashed in at will, would not serve that purpose.
Instead, transferring residual earnings rights to individual workers could
operate like an inflationary wage increase.
121
Already in 1975, LO-economist Rudolf Meidner proposed to channel
company profits into a trade-union-administered wage-earners' investment
fund which would have made the LO and the TCO (white-collar union) the
majority stockholder of all incorporated Swedish firms within twenty five
to thirty five years. 29 The Olof Palme government endorsed a variant of
the proposal, which three out of four union members opposed; his
government subsequently fell. In 1976, LO President Gunnar Nilsson
exclaimed that "[w]ith or without employee investment funds an inexorable
change is taking place in the part to be played by the trade unions."'
3 ° The
Palme proposal would have had incorporated enterprises with over fifty
employees issue special stock certificates equal to 20% of pretax profit into
collective employee funds. The dividends paid on those shares would flow
into a central clearing fund owned and managed by trade unions. SAF
proposed, as an alternative, that 1% of the annual wage bill be deposited
into decentralized regional funds that would invest in the shares of Swedish
industry. After five years, employees either could cash in their shares and
spend the money, or invest in regular Swedish stocks. 3'
127. Andrew Martin, The Dynamics of Change in a Keynesian Political Economy: The
Swedish Case and Its Implications, in STATE AND ECONOMY IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM
88, 112 (Colin Crouch ed., 1979).
128. D'ART, supra note 119, at 160.
129. THIMM, supra note 104, at 193.
130. Id. at 194.
131. Id. at 195.
VARIETIES OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Although less than a third of the workforce would be employed by
firms eligible to participate in profit sharing, the operation of the fund was
to benefit all workers collectively. Half the funds were to be used to
purchase shares from companies participating in the scheme if they issued
new shares. This would not only maintain the rate of worker participation,
but also render the funds an available source of equity for firms. The other
half were to be used to provide research and educational services to all
local unions and boards of sector funds. The central fund would not vote
its shares. Employee influence would be achieved through representation
on company boards of directors, the extent of which would depend on the
extent of central fund shareholding.1
32
The final version of the wage earner fund bill was passed in December
1983 with 164 votes in favor from Social Democrats and 158 against from
Centre Liberals and Conservatives. It was less "visionary" than earlier LO
proposals. Communists abstained from the vote because the proposal
"encouraged false reformist illusions. 133
The law set up five regional boards. Each had nine representatives,
with five worker representatives usually appointed by LO and the white-
collar union confederation (Tjdnstemdnnens Centralorganisation, TCO).
Others board members were appointed by the government. Because
businessmen refused to participate, representatives were chosen from
cooperative enterprises, local government officials, and academics.
The funds had two revenue sources. First, each firm had to contribute
20% of pre-tax profits exceeding 1 million SEK, or 6% of total payroll
costs, whichever was higher. Second, a 2% payroll tax was imposed on all
public and private corporations. Each regional fund received one-fifth of
the combined revenue from these two sources. They were to invest only in
Swedish companies and no fund could control more than 8% in a
corporation. Fifty percent of the voting rights in a company would be
transferred to the local union upon the union's request. The fund was to
transfer 3% on invested capital to the National Pension Fund each year.
This connection with the pension fund would help the underfunded pension
system, transmit money back to employees, and locate the entire scheme in
an existing legal framework.
1 34
In fact, wage earner funds did not manage their portfolios differently
than private investment companies.'35 They came to own a maximum of
approximately 5% of share capital in Sweden. Voting rights were
transferred to local unions in most cases, but they represented only a small
proportion of the total votes (0.5-4.0%). Unions nevertheless used the
132. D'ART, supra note 119, at 162.
133. Id. at 193.
134. Id. at 197.
135. Pontusson & Kuruvilla, supra note 120, at 790.
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votes in a variety of ways, from acquiring information from management,
to free lunches at annual general meetings.
136
The center-right coalition that governed Sweden between 1991 and
1994, headed by the Conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet),
abolished wage earner funds in 1992. As the law only provided financing
through 1990, it had only been managing existing assets for the previous
two years. Its demise was the price of a divisive yet politically-dependent
approach to employee ownership. That the funds have not been reinstituted
in part reflects a choice of proponents to expend political capital elsewhere.
More longstanding features of the Swedish model, including its highly
centralized wage bargaining system, were deteriorating throughout this
period. But it probably also reflects the minimal impact of the wage earner
funds, and the availability of other means by which to induce full
employment in the second half of the 1990s.
The first weapon of strong unions is collective bargaining. Collective
wage earner funds were endorsed as a means of generating and controlling
private investment to maintain full employment. When they proved to be
an ineffective, yet politically costly means to that end, Swedish unions
sought to exercise control by other means. Wage agreements were the
primary means by which workers would secure their share of firm profits.
IV. CONCLUSION
Employee ownership serves several of the same "final ends" in
different countries. Workers are to gain more from the profitability of their
employers, and to be more secure in their employment and in their
retirement. But, those final ends can be attained through a range of
intermediate means, each of which may be regarded as an end in itself in
the medium term. For example, legislation might transfer or create
incentives for firms to transfer a share of profits to workers (residual
income rights); or, legislation might empower workers to raise the present
and/or deferred price of labor in proportion to profitability (control). The
latter avoids many risks associated with concentrated residual earnings
rights but is only possible under certain institutional conditions. Most
significantly, unions must be capable of mediating and representing worker
interests; unions must be positioned to exercise worker control rights.
Direct voting is an inadequate means by which to exercise worker
control in any large firm. The election of union officers is an alternative by
which individual interests can orient the exercise of control rights vested in
workers as a group. If the unit to which control rights are assigned
encompasses all workers in the economy, no meaningful control is
136. GEORGE, supra note 84, at 179-181.
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politically possible. But if the law vests rights in smaller collectivities that
map onto union structures-by industry, by firm, or by workplace-unions
can harness control rights to secure a larger share of firm revenue for
workers.
In the United States, unions operate at the firm level, and firm-level
unionization may enable some workers to extract a higher fraction of firm
profits. However, those unions' exercise of power takes place within a
tightly circumscribed domain. Employee ownership initiatives have
instead focused on direct share ownership. Unfortunately, without a viable
means to exercise collective control of their shares, shares in their
employers have not been ultimately beneficial for most workers, or at least,
the benefits may be outweighed by the additional concentrated risk workers
assume. Because background institutions nevertheless favor employee
share ownership over direct union control at the management level, it may
be that we need to disaggregate the goals of employee ownership and
reassess how our institutional resources might best serve those objectives.
For example, it may be that a program promoting employee share
ownership should not promote ownership of one's employers but rather
share ownership more broadly. Employees would then be likely to achieve
a larger fraction of firm profits in the aggregate. While workplace
democracy is of independent value and will not necessarily follow greater
economic democracy, we are constrained by the institutions we have. A
program of employee ownership is unlikely to rewrite our institutional
matrix. It should take the consequences of our past choices into account.
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